Lebanon’s Army Claims Monopoly on Arms in the South, Testing Hezbollah’s Role and a Fragile Ceasefire

The hilltop bunker above the olive groves outside the southern Lebanese town of Mais al‑Jabal used to fly a yellow Hezbollah flag. Today, it is draped in red, white and green, guarded by soldiers in Lebanese army fatigues who wave civilian cars through a new checkpoint facing the Israeli frontier.

Army declaration signals a major shift

On Jan. 8, Lebanon’s army said scenes like this now define the country’s southern border. In a rare and pointed statement, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) announced it had achieved “the goal of a state monopoly on arms in the south in an effective and tangible way,” declaring that the first phase of a plan to bring all weapons under state control was complete.

The claim marks the most sweeping assertion of state authority over Lebanon’s volatile southern border region since the end of the 2006 war with Israel. It also tests a fragile security arrangement brokered with United States backing in late 2024, raises questions about Hezbollah’s future role along the frontier and puts new scrutiny on Israel’s military posture just across — and in some places still inside — Lebanese territory.

The army’s statement said its forces now exercise operational control over the strip of land between the Litani River and the U.N.-demarcated Blue Line with Israel, with the exception of Lebanese territory that remains under Israeli occupation. That area, roughly a 30‑kilometer‑deep band running the length of the border, corresponds to the zone where U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 mandated in 2006 that only the Lebanese state and U.N. peacekeepers may bear arms.

The announcement did not mention Hezbollah by name. But Lebanese officials, U.N. representatives and Israeli leaders all described it as a milestone in efforts to remove the Iran‑backed group’s overt military presence from the south, long the heartland of its “resistance” against Israel.

The 1701 framework — and why it frayed

Resolution 1701 ended 34 days of war in 2006 by calling for a full cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of Israeli troops, the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon and the deployment of Lebanese forces and the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) between the Litani and the border. In practice, Hezbollah rebuilt an extensive network of posts, tunnels and rocket launch sites in the area, while Israel held on to several positions in disputed or strategic locations and continued daily overflights of Lebanese territory.

That uneasy balance collapsed after the war in Gaza erupted in October 2023. Cross‑border exchanges between Israel and Hezbollah escalated into a wider conflict in 2024 that devastated large parts of southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, killing thousands and causing billions of dollars in damage. A U.S.-brokered “Cessation of Hostilities Understanding” announced on Nov. 26, 2024, sought to restore and tighten the 1701 framework.

Under that understanding, Lebanese officials say, Hezbollah agreed to dismantle its military infrastructure south of the Litani and remove heavy weapons from the zone. Israel was to withdraw its remaining forces north of the Blue Line and halt offensive operations in Lebanon. The LAF was tasked with deploying thousands of troops into the south and enforcing what the agreement and subsequent Cabinet decisions in Beirut described as a state “monopoly on arms” in the area.

Positions, seizures and UN reporting

Army officers say the Jan. 8 declaration reflects more than a legal formula. Over the past year, the LAF, often working alongside UNIFIL, has established about 130 permanent positions south of the Litani, taken over or destroyed scores of former Hezbollah sites and cleared weapons depots, rocket launch pads and tunnel networks left from the 2024 fighting.

“There will be no other armed group able to operate or launch attacks from southern Lebanon,” a Lebanese security source said, describing the intent of the new posture.

UNIFIL’s leadership has largely backed the army’s description of conditions on the ground. In a briefing late last year, the mission’s commander, Maj. Gen. Diodato Abagnara, said peacekeepers had “no evidence that Hezbollah is trying to re‑establish itself militarily in the south” and had “not observed any new illegal infrastructure” within the force’s area of operations.

The U.N. reports that more than 300 weapons caches and unauthorized military sites south of the Litani have been identified and neutralized since the 2024 ceasefire took hold, often in coordination with Lebanese forces.

Hezbollah’s limits and red lines

Yet the picture remains incomplete and politically charged.

Hezbollah has so far avoided a detailed public response to the Jan. 8 statement. But its position on the broader disarmament drive has been explicit. When Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s government formally adopted the goal of a nationwide state monopoly on arms in August 2025 and ordered the army to prepare a phased plan, Hezbollah declared it would “deal with it as if it does not exist,” calling the decision a “grave sin” that serves Israel’s interests. Hezbollah and Amal Movement ministers walked out of the Cabinet session that approved the plan.

Officials and analysts in Beirut say the group has made tactical concessions in the south while drawing a red line against full disarmament. Local reporting has documented the handover of dozens of Hezbollah locations south of the Litani to the army, often after heavy weapons and sensitive equipment were removed. Hezbollah’s political apparatus, social services and alliances in the region remain intact, and residents and Western officials alike say some fighters have stayed in their home villages with light arms, out of uniform and out of sight.

An army officer quoted in Lebanese media recently dismissed Israeli assertions that Hezbollah is rebuilding positions in the south, saying he doubted the group would be able “to do anything anymore” in that area. But even supporters of the government’s policy acknowledge that Hezbollah’s main arsenal — long‑range rockets, precision missiles and anti‑ship and anti‑aircraft systems — is believed to be concentrated north of the Litani and outside the current security zone.

Israel’s skepticism and ongoing strikes

Israel has greeted the Lebanese army’s move with cautious skepticism. The office of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the U.S.-brokered ceasefire “states clearly, Hezbollah must be fully disarmed,” calling the Lebanese efforts an “encouraging beginning” but “far from sufficient.”

The Israeli military has continued to carry out strikes on what it describes as Hezbollah targets across Lebanon, and Israeli forces maintain fortified positions in several locations on the Lebanese side of the Blue Line. Israeli officials argue that as long as Hezbollah retains tens of thousands of rockets elsewhere in the country and Iranian support, shifting its frontline a few dozen kilometers north does not fundamentally change the threat.

Lebanese leaders counter that the LAF’s expanded presence in the south makes further Israeli incursions and bombardments harder to justify under international law. President Joseph Aoun, a former army commander elected in January 2025, has repeatedly said the state’s priority is to “extend its authority and its legitimate arms over all Lebanese territory” and prevent any party from unilaterally dragging the country into war.

UNIFIL’s future and Lebanon’s economic stakes

For the United Nations, the latest developments are closely tied to the future of its peacekeeping mission. In August 2025, the Security Council renewed UNIFIL’s mandate through the end of 2026, describing the extension as a final one and calling for an “orderly and safe drawdown and withdrawal” thereafter. The council said the aim was for the Lebanese state to become “the sole provider of security” in the south.

Diplomats and U.N. officials say the army’s declaration of an effective monopoly on arms in the south is a crucial benchmark for that transition, even if it does not resolve broader disputes over Hezbollah’s weapons or Israeli military activity.

Inside Lebanon, the stakes are not only military but also economic. The country is still reeling from a financial collapse that began in 2019 and from the added destruction of the 2024 war, which the government estimates caused about $11 billion in damage. Economy Minister Amer Bisat has argued that restoring credible state control over borders and weapons is a precondition for major international aid and investment.

Many Lebanese political parties, particularly among Christian and Sunni blocs, support the push to limit arms to the state, saying Hezbollah’s independent decision‑making has drawn the country into repeated, costly confrontations. But in predominantly Shiite areas of the south, some residents say the erosion of Hezbollah’s frontline role leaves them feeling more vulnerable to Israel, not less, especially as Israeli drones continue to buzz overhead and troops remain on nearby ridgelines.

On a recent afternoon near the border, a shopkeeper in a village south of the Litani watched an army patrol pass and shrugged.

“It is good to see the soldiers here,” he said, asking that his name not be published to avoid trouble. “But the planes are still above us, the Israelis are still in our land, and Hezbollah is still in our politics. Nothing is finished.”

Whether the Lebanese state’s new claim to a “monopoly on arms” in the south marks the beginning of a lasting shift, or just another precarious arrangement along one of the region’s most contested frontiers, will depend on forces well beyond that hilltop bunker where the flag has changed but the front line has not moved.