Saudi Arabia Accuses UAE of Spiriting Yemen’s Southern Separatist Leader Out of Aden

On a recent January night in Aden, as Saudi-backed forces tightened their grip on Yemen’s interim capital, southern separatist leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi is said to have slipped out of the city by sea.

By morning, Saudi officials claimed, the 58-year-old head of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) was on a Soviet-era cargo plane that took off from Somaliland, touched down briefly in Somalia’s capital and then flew on to Abu Dhabi. The aircraft’s transponder allegedly went dark over the Gulf of Oman, flickering back on minutes before landing at a military airfield in the United Arab Emirates.

Saudi Arabia now accuses the UAE—its closest Gulf partner in the Yemen war for nearly a decade—of orchestrating the escape of a man the internationally recognized Yemeni government has charged with high treason. The UAE has not confirmed the account or offered its own version of events, exposing a rare public rupture inside the anti-Houthi coalition.

The dispute is about more than a dramatic getaway. It crystallizes how Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which entered Yemen’s conflict together in 2015, have grown sharply apart over the future of the country’s south and the map of power along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

Saudi account details alleged route through Somaliland and Somalia

The Saudi-led coalition made its allegations public on Jan. 8 in a detailed military statement and a coordinated media campaign. Coalition spokesman Maj. Gen. Turki al-Malki said al-Zubaidi “escaped in the dead of night” on Jan. 7 aboard a vessel that left Aden’s port for Berbera, the main harbor of Somaliland, a self-declared republic in northern Somalia.

From there, al-Malki said, al-Zubaidi boarded an Ilyushin Il-76 transport plane “accompanied by Emirati officers.” The flight, he said, routed through Mogadishu before heading to Al-Reef military airport in Abu Dhabi. Saudi officials have linked the Il-76 to earlier operations in conflict zones such as Ethiopia, Libya and Somalia, where the UAE has faced accusations of ferrying weapons to allied factions.

In an unusual step in Gulf diplomacy, Saudi media amplified the accusations by publishing the name and nom de guerre of an Emirati major general they said helped oversee the operation. Officials in Abu Dhabi declined to comment on the specific claims.

Somalia’s Immigration and Citizenship Agency announced it was opening an investigation into whether its airspace and an airport had been used without authorization “for the movement of a fugitive political figure.” In a public statement, the agency said such actions, if confirmed, would amount to an “unacceptable” and “serious breach” of national sovereignty and immigration laws.

Somaliland authorities have not publicly addressed the reported use of Berbera in the operation. Internationally, Somaliland is considered part of Somalia, though it has run its own administration and port for decades and has developed close commercial ties with the UAE.

Confrontation in Aden and treason allegations

The alleged escape came at the climax of a fast-moving confrontation between al-Zubaidi’s STC, which seeks to restore an independent South Yemen, and Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) in Aden.

In December, the STC launched what it called Operation Promising Future, a sweeping offensive that saw its forces expand their control across much of the territory of the former South Yemen. Fighters aligned with al-Zubaidi moved into the oil-rich Hadramaut region and the eastern province of al-Mahra, which border Saudi Arabia and host vital transport corridors.

On Jan. 2, the STC leadership announced its intention to organize an independence referendum within two years, saying it would seek to revive a separate southern state with Aden as its capital. That declaration directly challenged the Saudi-backed government’s insistence on Yemen’s territorial unity.

Riyadh and the PLC responded with a military and political counteroffensive. Saudi warplanes struck STC-linked positions in several southern governorates, and coalition ground units known as the Homeland Shield Forces moved to assert control over Aden, including the presidential palace and key security sites.

On Jan. 7, PLC chairman Rashad al-Alimi issued a decree dismissing al-Zubaidi from the eight-member council and referring him to the prosecutor general on charges of high treason. The decree cited several provisions of Yemen’s Crimes and Penal Code, including Article 125, which covers acts aimed at “undermining the independence and unity of the Republic,” and Article 126, which addresses the formation of armed gangs and attacks on military installations. Additional articles alleged damage to Yemen’s military, political and economic standing and assaults on constitutional authorities.

Al-Alimi also invoked provisions of the law governing the trial of senior officials, accusing al-Zubaidi of violating the constitution and threatening national sovereignty.

Saudi and Yemeni officials accuse the STC chief of arming loyalists in Aden and his home province of Dhale in preparation for a confrontation with coalition forces. They say he rejected a Saudi summons to come to Riyadh for talks.

Some STC officials insisted publicly on Jan. 7 that their leader remained in Aden and was ready to “fight it out.” The council has not issued any statement acknowledging his departure from Yemen since the Saudi allegations.

Riyadh’s media campaign and bid to reshape the southern file

Saudi-owned outlets quickly framed the reported escape as an act of betrayal. The English-language daily Arab News ran a front-page image of al-Zubaidi under a bold “WANTED” banner, calling him a “traitor” who “aligned with foreign powers at the expense of his homeland” and sought to impose secession “by force.”

Saudi officials have paired those accusations with efforts to separate the broader southern cause from al-Zubaidi personally. After the alleged escape, Saudi Ambassador to Yemen Mohammed al-Jaber posted a photograph from Riyadh showing him alongside 19 southern Yemeni figures he described as an STC delegation.

Al-Jaber said in a social media post that al-Zubaidi’s actions had “harmed the Southern cause and did not serve it, and damaged the unity of the front in confronting the enemies.” He said discussions focused on a planned “Southern Cause Conference” in Riyadh that would, in his words, “restore stability” and protect Yemeni unity.

The United Nations’ special envoy for Yemen, Hans Grundberg, has called the proposed conference a “timely opportunity to reduce tensions in the south and move discussions towards stabilization,” urging all parties to return to dialogue.

A widening Saudi–Emirati rift inside the anti-Houthi camp

For the UAE, the accusations over al-Zubaidi’s departure land atop a broader dispute with Saudi Arabia over its Yemen role. Abu Dhabi deployed significant ground forces in Yemen’s south and along the Red Sea coast in the early years of the war and built up a network of local partners, including the STC and Emirati-trained units such as the Security Belt and Giants Brigades.

While the UAE announced a drawdown of its front-line troops in 2019, it has retained a footprint of advisers, aircraft and bases and has maintained close ties with southern factions. Saudi officials in recent weeks have accused the UAE of backing the STC’s December offensive and attempting to smuggle weapons into Yemen. Emirati officials have publicly denied those charges and said the country is ending what it now describes as its “counterterrorism mission” in Yemen.

Analysts say al-Zubaidi has been a central pillar of the UAE’s southern Yemen strategy since his days as Aden governor, when he became a prominent figure in the anti-Houthi resistance and in the Southern Movement pushing for renewed independence. Protecting him from arrest or potential harm could preserve Emirati leverage in any future settlement, in the form of an exiled southern leader with a loyal constituency.

The Saudi decision to publicize specific details of the alleged operation—including the aircraft type, flight path and the name of an Emirati commander—marks a departure from the Gulf states’ usual preference for handling disputes in private. It appears designed in part to increase the diplomatic cost for the UAE and to signal that Riyadh sees southern secession, and foreign backing for it, as crossing a red line.

Regional implications from Somalia to the Red Sea

The fallout extends beyond the Arabian Peninsula. Somalia, still struggling to affirm control over its territory and airspace after decades of conflict, has repeatedly voiced concern about foreign militaries using its land and ports without full coordination with Mogadishu. Any confirmation that a high-profile fugitive transited through Somali facilities without approval could spur new tensions with Gulf partners and prompt tighter restrictions on military and charter flights.

Inside Yemen, the confrontation risks opening a new front in a war that has already killed tens of thousands of people and pushed millions to the brink of famine. While large-scale fighting between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthi movement has eased compared with earlier years, Houthi forces continue to hold the capital, Sanaa, and much of the north and have stepped up attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

A prolonged Saudi campaign against STC elements in the south could divert resources from efforts to secure a nationwide cease-fire or negotiate a political deal with the Houthis. It could also destabilize key ports and oil infrastructure in Aden, Hadramaut and al-Mahra that are critical for imports, fuel supplies and humanitarian aid.

For southerners who rallied behind the STC’s recent independence push, the sight of their leader being branded a traitor in Riyadh and, according to Saudi officials, flown to safety in Abu Dhabi may reshape perceptions of both local and regional power brokers. Some may view al-Zubaidi’s departure as a tactical retreat; others may see it as abandonment.

Whether the episode proves to be a brief flare-up that Saudi and Emirati leaders smooth over behind closed doors, or the start of a more enduring rivalry over the shape of Yemen and the wider Red Sea region, remains unclear. What is evident is that a war launched in 2015 under the banner of a united Arab coalition has, in 2026, laid bare its internal fault lines—and that Yemen’s fractured future will now be shaped not only by its own factions and the Houthis, but by competing visions in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.