Recent discoveries of undocumented communication devices within Chinese-manufactured solar inverters have raised significant concerns about potential cyber threats to global energy infrastructure. These devices, such as cellular radios, can bypass standard firewalls, potentially allowing remote manipulation that could damage energy infrastructure and destabilize grids.

The U.S. Department of Energy has emphasized the need for transparency in device functionalities to safeguard against potential threats. Chinese companies like Huawei, Sungrow, and Ginlong Solis dominate the global inverter market, leading to legislative efforts to ban federal procurement of Chinese batteries and calls for similar restrictions on inverters.

In November 2024, a China-based remote disabling of inverters raised alarms, highlighting the possibility of deliberate disruption. Industry and security experts warn of potential catastrophic outcomes from mass disruptions, particularly in Europe where over 200 GW of solar capacity relies on Chinese-made inverters.

Countries including Lithuania, Estonia, and the U.K. are also reconsidering their use of Chinese renewable energy technology. Lithuania has enacted legislation to block Chinese inverters from its energy infrastructure, citing cybersecurity risks.

The European Solar Manufacturing Council (ESMC) has called for an EU “Inverter Security Toolbox” to address these concerns. Christoph Podewils, ESMC Secretary General, stated, “Today, over 200 GW of European PV capacity is already linked to inverters manufactured in China – the equivalent of more than 200 nuclear power plants. This means Europe has effectively surrendered remote control of a vast portion of its electricity infrastructure.”

The Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) in Germany has also warned of substantial risk potential, noting that many of the inverters for solar panels used in German homes are made by producers from China, and the Asian country’s government or other actors might be able to directly access the devices that are connected to the internet and influence the electricity system.

In response to these concerns, the White House announced measures to protect U.S. solar manufacturers from Chinese competition by eliminating tariff exemptions for imported double-sided solar panels and simplifying subsidy qualifications for using American-made products.

The potential for remote manipulation of energy infrastructure raises significant concerns about national security and sovereignty. Dependence on foreign-manufactured critical components could expose nations to external control over their energy systems. Heightened security concerns may lead to increased costs for renewable energy projects as countries seek to source components from alternative, potentially more expensive, manufacturers. This could slow the adoption of renewable energy technologies.

Ensuring the security and reliability of energy infrastructure is paramount. Transparency in the functionalities of all components is essential to safeguard against potential threats. Diversifying and securing energy infrastructure supply chains is crucial to mitigate strategic vulnerabilities and protect national security.